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Tort Law. Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the limited-recovery rule to
compensate the parents of a child born after a negligently-per-
formed sterilization procedure.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court confronted an issue of first
impression. The court accepted two questions of law certified by a
superior court judge: (1) whether a cause of action exists for a neg-
ligently performed sterilization procedure, and, if so, (2) then what
is the appropriate measure of damages.
FACTS AND CASE TRAVEL
The plaintiffs, Diane Emerson (Diane) and Thomas Emerson
(collectively the Emersons), filed a complaint alleging negligence in
the performance of a sterilization procedure. The defendant, Dr.
Henry Magendantz (Dr. Magendantz), filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules
of Civil Procedure.'
The facts, as summarized from the pleadings and documents
submitted to both the superior and supreme courts, are as follows.
For financial reasons, the Emersons decided to limit their family to
one child.2 Diane chose to have a tubal ligation.3 Dr. Magendantz
performed the procedure on January 10, 1991. Despite the sterili-
zation procedure, Diane became pregnant. On January 11, 1992,
Diane gave birth to Kirsten, a child alleged to have congenital
problems. 4 Another physician performed a second tubal ligation
subsequent to Kirsten's birth.6
The Emersons filed suit in Rhode Island Superior Court in
March of 1994. They alleged that Dr. Magendantz's negligent
tubal ligation proximately caused Kirsten's birth, and that the de-
fendant did not properly inform Diane nor obtain her consent
before surgery.6 Additionally, the Emersons sought recovery for
1. Emerson v. Magendantz 689 A.2d 409, 410 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id.
3. See id. A tubal ligation is the ligation of the fallopian tubes to prevent
passage of the ova from the ovaries to the uterus used as a method of female steril-
ization. See Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1270 (10th ed. 1995).
4. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 410. The congenital problems are only generally
described in the complaint. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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physical pain due to the unexpected pregnancy and the second
tubal ligation for Diane, mental suffering and loss of wages.7 Fur-
ther, the Emersons asserted, as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence, they were obligated to bear the cost of the medical care and
maintenance of Kirsten.8
Dr. Magendantz filed a motion to dismiss. In response, the su-
perior court judge certified two questions of law to the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court. The questions were: (1) does a cause of
action exist under Rhode Island law when a physician negligently
performs a sterilization procedure and the patient subsequently
becomes pregnant and delivers a child from that pregnancy? and
(2) if so, then what is the appropriate measure of damages?9
ANALYSIS
The question whether a cause of action exists when a physi-
cian negligently performs a sterilization procedure and the patient
subsequently becomes pregnant and delivers a child posed an issue
of first impression in Rhode Island. 10 The court analyzed thirty-
five decisions by courts that have considered this question."1 Only
one state's court of last resort refused to recognize a tort cause of
action in this situation. 12 Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme
Court hinted that a breach of warranty action may exist.13
Approximately thirty-five jurisdictions have recognized a tort
cause of action for the negligent performance of sterilization proce-
dures performed on the husband or wife, for which recovery would
be allowed under state law.' 4 This substantial majority ofjurisdic-
tions persuaded the court that negligent performance of a steriliza-
tion procedure is a tort for which recovery is allowed. Prior to this,
7. See id. at 410-11.
8. See id. at 411.
9. See id. at 410.
10. See id. at 411.
11. See id.; see, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v.
Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151
(La. 1988).
12. See Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Nev. 1986).
13. See id.
14. See id.; see, e.g., University of Arizona Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Ct.
of Arizona, 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982);
Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass.
1990); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Marciniak v.
Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
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a cause of action for pregnancy resulting from a failed sterilization
procedure did not exist in Rhode Island.15 Thus, the court an-
swered the first certified question affirmatively. 16
Having found that a cause of action existed, the court analyzed
the second certified question-the extent of the measure of dam-
ages. In this analysis, the court scrutinized the various remedies
that courts across the nation have constructed. Three general
types of remedies exist as compensation for negligent sterilization
procedures which result in pregnancy: (1) the limited-recovery
remedy, (2) full recovery with benefit offsets and (3) full recovery
without benefit offsets. 17 The first type of remedy is the limited-
recovery, which has been adopted by thirty jurisdictions.' 8 Under
the limited-recovery rule, courts typically grant plaintiffs compen-
sation for the medical expenses of the unsuccessful sterilization
procedure, the medical and hospital costs of the pregnancy, the
cost of an additional sterilization procedure and loss of wages.
Generally, medical expenses for prenatal care, delivery and post-
natal care are included. Occasionally, courts grant damages for an
emotional-distress claim due to the unexpected pregnancy and loss
of consortium.19
The second and third types of remedies allow recovery for the
cost of child-rearing as an element of damages.20 Two methods ex-
ist for computing such a cost. Using a cost/benefit analysis, the
15. The issue of whether to award damages for the birth of a healthy child was
unknown to the common law. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 414 n.2.
16. See id. at 411.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1990)
(holding that parents may be able to recover damages for extraordinary expenses
of caring for, maintaining and educating child with Down's Syndrome where
health care providers were negligent in performing and timely reporting prenatal
chromosomal study); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988)
(granting expenses of pregnancy and delivery, mother's pain and suffering, loss of
consortium and emotional distress for pregnancy resulting from failed steriliza-
tion, and intimating that proof of foreseeable risk of birth defects might result in
greater damages); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982) (referring to the
case as "wrongful birth" case, but the child was healthy); Hitzemann v. Adam, 518
N.W.2d 102 (Neb. 1994) (granting prenatal and delivery medical expenses, emo-
tional distress, loss of wages, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium); Crawford
v. Kirk, 929 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App. 1996), reh'g denied (holding parents of a nor-
mal, healthy child born after a failed sterilization procedure may recover damages
for their actual medical expenses incurred as a result of the failed procedure).
19. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 412.
20. See id.
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first method balances the benefits derived by the parents against
the cost of child-rearing. The benefits of the birth of a healthy
child can be economical or emotional.21 The second method,
adopted by New Mexico and Wisconsin, allows for full recovery,
without offsetting the economic or emotional benefits derived from
the birth of a healthy child.22 These two courts apply traditional
tort principles which allow recovery for all damages reasonably
foreseeable that result from negligent performance of a steriliza-
tion procedure. 23
New Mexico analyzed section 920 of the Second Restatement
of Torts which advocates consideration of the benefits conferred in
mitigation of the damages. That court denied recovery for emo-
tional distress. That same court denied any offset of emotional ben-
efits derived from having a healthy child,24 as did Wisconsin. 25
Faced with the choice of limited recovery, full recovery with
benefits and full recovery without benefits, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court decided to adopt the limited-recovery rule, except
for the element of emotional distress.26 The court reasoned that it
is impossible to establish with reasonable certainty whether the
birth of a particular healthy child economically or emotionally
damaged his or her parents. The court relied on decisions that re-
fused to predict the measure of damages for emotional distress or
child rearing of a normal, healthy baby.27 These courts cast the
21. See id.; see, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Ct.,
667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1993); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Burke v.
Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990).
22. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 412; see, e.g., Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805
P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990).
23. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 412.
24. Lovelace, 805 P.2d at 613-14 (concluding that applying emotional benefits
to economical loss was not comparing analogous benefits).
25. Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at 249 (declining to offset economic benefits be-
cause they were deemed to be insignificant).
26. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 412.
27. See id.; see, e.g., Johnson v. University Hosp. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d
1370, 1377 (Ohio 1989); Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at 249; McKernan v. Aasheim, 687
P.2d 850, 855 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
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damages as "an exercise in prophesy"28 in a contravention of public
policy.29
Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that
public policy precludes granting child-rearing costs where a
healthy child is born and the parents did not opt for adoption.30
The court was persuaded that the parents' decision to forego adop-
tion was evidence that the benefit of retaining the child out-
weighed the economic costs of child rearing.3 '
If the child is born with congenital defects, as a result of an
unwanted pregnancy due to a negligently-performed sterilization
procedure, then the court recognized that the financial and emo-
tional drain associated with raising such a child is often over-
whelming to the affected parents.3 2 The court determined that it
would follow the reasoning adopted by the Florida Supreme Court
in Fassoulas v. Ramey.33
In Fassoulas, Mr. and Mrs. Fassoulas (Plaintiffs) had two chil-
dren with severe congenital defects. They subsequently decided
not to have any more children. Mr. Fassoulas had a vasectomy.
Despite the vasectomy, the Plaintiffs had two more children. 34
One of the children had a correctable birth deformity. The Florida
court denied recovery for child-rearing expenses for a normal
healthy child because a parent cannot be said to have been dam-
aged by the birth and rearing of a normal, healthy child.3 5 How-
ever, in the case of a physically or mentally-handicapped child, the
court should allow special medical and educational expenses, in
addition to normal rearing costs.36
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the Fassoulas hold-
ing. However, it added the following. A physician performing a
sterilization procedure, who knows or should know, by reason of
statistical information or experience, that parents have a reason-
28. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 413 (quoting Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8,
12 (Del. 1975)).
29. See id.; see, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (Wis.
1974) (citing Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957)) (superseded by Marci-
niak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. 1990)).
30. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 412-13.
31. See id. at 413.
32. See id. at 414.
33. See id. (citing Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984)).
34. Fassoulas, 540 So. 2d at 822.
35. See id. at 823-24.
36. See id. at 824.
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able expectation of giving birth to a physically or mentally-handi-
capped child, may be liable for the entire cost of raising such a
child.3 7 The court noted that the extraordinary costs of maintain-
ing a handicapped child would not end at the child's majority, nor
would the physician's liability necessarily end at that point.38 The
parents have incurred a continuous obligation to expend monetary
resources for the medical care and maintenance of the child.
Where the child is mentally or physically handicapped, that fact
should also entitle the parents to compensation for emotional
distress.3 9
Dissent
Justice Bourcier, joined by Justice Flanders, concurred as to
the first certified question.40 Thereafter, however Justice Bourcier
vigorously dissented with respect to the court's holding on the sec-
ond certified question. 41 The crux of Justice Bourcier's argument
was that the true legal nature of the within cause of action was
"nothing more and nothing less than a medical malpractice cause
of action."42 He would permit recovery for all of the negligent de-
fendant's reasonably foreseeable and proximately-caused injuries
and damages.43 Additionally, Justice Bourcier voiced concern that
the majority was denying a woman's constitutional right not to
have children. 44
The majority responded that the constitutional rights regard-
ing contraception and abortion, referred to by the dissent, inhibit
governmental agencies from interfering with the exercise of such
rights.45 The majority believed that these cases have "little if any
relevance to our determining a measure of damages for a negligent
act performed by a physician." 46
37. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 414.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 415 (Bourcier, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 415-23.
42. Id. at 415 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301 (Va. 1986)).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 416-417 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
45. See Emerson, 689 A.2d at 414 n.2.
46. Id.
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Justice Bourcier also noted that the majority's measure of
damages created a suspect classification, which discriminated
against victims of medical malpractice.47 The majority responded
that this accusation was unfounded, as suspect classifications are
those based upon race, alienage or national origin.4
CONCLUSION
A cause of action exists when a physician negligently performs
a sterilization procedure, with resulting pregnancy and childbirth.
Parents may recover the medical expenses of the ineffective sterili-
zation procedure, medical and hospital costs of the pregnancy, ex-
penses of a subsequent sterilization procedure, loss of wages, loss
of consortium to the spouse arising out of the unwanted pregnancy,
and medical expenses for prenatal care, delivery and postnatal
care. In the event that the child is born with congenital defects,
full recovery is allowed, with physician liability continuing beyond
the child's majority.
Vicki J. Ray
47. See id. at 418-20.
48. See id. at 414 n.2.
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Tort Law. Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691 (R.I. 1997). A golfer's
errant tee shot that veered off the playing course and struck a resi-
dent on an abutting property gave rise to issues of material fact
regarding whether the golfer hit the tee shot negligently, whether
the golfer failed to adequately warn the resident and whether the
resident assumed the risk of injury, thereby rendering summary
judgment disposition improper.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Eileen Hennessey (Hennessey), owns a condo-
minium in North Providence, Rhode Island. The Louisquisset Golf
Club operates a golf course on the property abutting the property
on which Hennessey's condominium is situated. Specifically, her
backyard sits approximately fourteen feet from the left boundary
of the golf club's eleventh hole fairway, a dogleg left.1
On a Sunday morning in mid-September of 1993, Hennessey
stood outside her condominium in her garden. While Hennessey
was in her garden, Michael Pyne (Pyne), the assistant golf-pro at
Louisquisset Golf Club, hit a golf ball from the tee at the eleventh
hole. The ball veered to the left of the golf club's playing area and
struck Hennessey in the head while on her property, thereby injur-
ing her. No evidence exists that Pyne yelled "fore!"2
Hennessey sued Pyne, as well as the Louisquisset Country
Club Condominium Association and its executive board.3 She al-
leged that Pyne was liable for (1) nuisance, (2) assault and battery,
(3) loss of consortium and (4) negligence. A Rhode Island Superior
Court judge dismissed each of Hennessey's four claims against
Pyne pursuant to Pyne's motion for summary judgment. Hennes-
sey appealed this dismissal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.4
On appeal, the supreme court considered whether the superior
court's summary-judgment dismissal of Hennessey's claims
against Pyne was proper.5
1. See Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 693 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. at 694.
3. This case involves only Hennessey's appeal regarding those causes of ac-
tion brought against Pyne. See id. at 694-95.
4. See id. at 695.
5. See id.
19981
564 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387
BACKGROUND
To establish liability in a negligence cause of action, the plain-
tiff must, as a threshold matter, show that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care.6 In determining whether such a duty of
care exists, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has employed a func-
tional, ad-hoc approach.7 Factors germane to this determination
include the parties' relationship,8 the scope and the burden of the
defendant's obligation,9 public-policy concerns' 0 and notions of
fairness."H At bottom, however, the touchstone of the existence of a
duty is the extent to which the risk of injury is foreseeable. 12
In addition, the plaintiff can establish negligence by showing
that the defendant failed to adequately warn him or her of the im-
pending harm.' 3 With respect to golf, the general failure to warn
rule is that in hitting a shot, a golfer "must, in the exercise of ordi-
nary care, give an adequate and timely warning to those who are
unaware of his or her intention to play and who may be endan-
gered by the play .... [Tihis duty does not extend to those persons
who are not in the line of play if danger to them is not to be
anticipated." 14
Finally, in order to establish an assumption of the risk de-
fense, a defendant must show "that plaintiff knew of the existence
of a danger, appreciated its unreasonable character, and then vol-
untarily exposed himself to it."'5 The court will analyze this de-
6. See id. at 697 (citing Kenney Mfg. Co. v. Starkweather & Shepley, Inc.,
643 A.2d 203, 206 (R.I. 1994)); Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 685 (R.I. 1994);
Rodrigues v. Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456, 460 (R.I. 1993). This determination is a
question of law reserved for the court. See Mallette v. Children's Friend and Serv.,
661 A.2d 67, 69 (R.I. 1995); Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1224
(R.I. 1987).
7. See Kenney, 643 A.2d at 206; Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685 & n.2.
8. See Kenney, 643 A.2d at 206.
9. See id.
10. See Rock v. State, 681 A.2d 901, 903 (R.I. 1996).
11. See id.
12. See Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 466 (R.I. 1996);
Builders Specialty Co. v. Goulet, 639 A.2d 59, 60 (R.I. 1994) ("The 'risk reasonably
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to
another or to others within the range of apprehension.'") (quoting Palsgrafv. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (emphasis omitted)).
13. See Ludwikoski v. Kurotsu, 875 F. Supp. 727, 731 (D.R.I. 1995).
14. Id.
15. Drew v. Wall, 495 A.2d 229, 231 (R.I. 1985) (citing Rickey v. Boden, 421
A.2d 539, 543 (R.I. 1980)).
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fense from a subjective perspective, determining what the plaintiff
actually "saw, knew, understood, and appreciated at the time of his
injury."16
ANALysIs AND HOLDING
Justice Flanders authored the opinion for the supreme court. 17
The court outlined the three causes of action on which the superior
court granted summary judgment: nuisance, assault and battery,
and negligence.' 8 The court affirmed the superior court's dismissal
of the nuisance claim 19 as well as the assault and battery claim.20
However, the supreme court reversed the superior court's dismis-
sal of the negligence claim.21
16. Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, 678 A.2d 867, 872 (R.I. 1996) (cit-
ing Drew, 495 A.2d at 231-32; Filosa v. Courtois Sand & Gravel Co., 590 A.2d 100,
103 (R.I. 1991)).
17. Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691 (Flanders, J., joined by Weisberger, C.J.
Lederberg & Bourcier, JJ.)
18. See id. at 693.
19. See id. at 695 (citing Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640
A.2d 950, 957 (R.I. 1994) (holding that a person is liable for nuisance if he uses his
property in an unreasonable manner so as to "materially interfere[ ] with a neigh-
bor's physical comfort or... use of... real estate"). The court held that Pyne was
not liable for nuisance because his use of the golf course's property was not unrea-
sonable and he was not Hennessey's neighbor in the typical sense of the word. See
id.
20. Hennessey waived her right to appeal the trial court's finding as to assault
because she did not raise it in her brief. See id. at 695. Additionally, a person is
liable for battery when he or she acts in such a manner that "was intended to
cause, and in fact did cause, 'an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of
or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in the consumma-
tion of the assault." Id. at 696 (quoting Picard v. Barry Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 654
A.2d 690, 694 (R.I. 1995) (citing Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I. 1983))).
However, the plaintiff does not have to establish that the defendant intended to
injure the plaintiff if he or she can establish that the "defendant willfully set[] in
motion a force that in its ordinary cause cause[d] the injury." Picard, 654 A.2d at
694. Pyne did not intend offensive contact here, and the golf ball did not hit Hen-
nessey "in its ordinary course." Hennessey, 694 A.2d at 696. Therefore, the supe-
rior court finding here was proper. See id.
21. See Hennesey, 694 A.2d at 697-700. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's
husband's claim for loss of consortium. "A] claim for loss of consortium is a sepa-
rate and distinct cause of action" from the action which the injured plaintiff may
bring. Id. at 696 (quoting Normandin v. Levine, 621 A.2d 713, 716 (R.I. 1993)).
Consequently, in order for a party in the trial court to preserve an issue relative to
loss of consortium on appeal, the party must traverse the appellate process in-
dependent of the primary complainant. Here, the rightful appellant regarding the
loss of consortium relative to Hennessey's injuries is her husband. Because he did
1998] 565
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Negligence
With respect to the negligence claim, the court first noted that
the superior court judge granted Pyne's motion for summary judg-
ment because he opined that Pyne did not have a duty of care to
Hennessey.22 In so doing, the court noted some of the superior
court judge's reasoning, namely, that the facts that Hennessey
lived next to a golf course, was aware of the likelihood of golf balls
landing in her yard-as it had occurred several times previously-
and did not see Pyne tee off, coupled with the fact that Pyne did not
see Hennessey in her yard when he teed off, demonstrated that
Pyne did not possess a duty of care to Hennessey.23
The supreme court disagreed with the superior court judge's
conclusion and reasoning. The court held that a golfer does owe a
duty of care to those people residing on property abutting a golf
course who the golfer knows are within the reasonable striking dis-
tance for the shot which he or she is taking.24 The court outlined
the rule in such cases-the fact that a person was struck by a golf
ball does not necessarily constitute negligence; however, a golfer
has a duty to exercise reasonable care as to those people who the
golfer knows are within striking distance for the shot he or she is
not appeal independently and did not move to bring his appeal jointly, he waived
his right to appeal. See id. & n.14.
22. See id at 695 n.11 (quoting Hennessey v. Pyne, C.A. No. 95-687) (R.I.
Super. Ct.).
23. See id.
[Hennessey] resides adjacent to the golf course and had prior to the inci-
dent giving rise to this litigation, become aware that golf balls were com-
ing into her yard with, 'an unfortunate frequency,' .... This has been
going on for some time and she had, again, prior to this instance or inci-
dent, complained to the golf course to do something about this. However,
... at the time in question, . . the golfer couldn't see her. [And sihe
couldn't see the golfer.
I don't believe in this set of circumstances, that this golfer owed her a
duty. He didn't know she was there, and she was-and voluntarily placed
herself into a position that she knew would be a receptacle from time to
time for errant golf shots .... He had no reason to believe that his shot
would go the way that it did, and that it would have an impact on this
woman.
Id. at n.11.
24. See id. at 697.
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taking.25 Accordingly, the salient question becomes whether Pyne
breached that duty of care. 26
In order to answer this query, the fact finder must first con-
sider several preliminary circumstances: (1) whether Pyne was
aware of the proximity of Hennessey's condominium to the fairway
on which he was playing; (2) whether Pyne was aware that golfers
consistently hit Hennessey's condominium with golf balls; (3)
whether Pyne was aware of Hennessey's ostensibly consistent com-
plaints regarding the golf shots that hit her condominium and (4)
whether Pyne was aware of the advantage he could attain by driv-
ing the golf ball as close to Hennessey's condominium as possible to
play the dogleg hole. These circumstances, again integral to the
determination of the negligence claim, present questions of mate-
rial fact. By definition, then, summary judgment is an improper
means of disposing of these issues.27
Next, the court considered Pyne's alleged failure to warn Hen-
nessey. Generally, the court stated, the rule is that a golfer, "in the
exercise of ordinary care,"28 must warn others who may be harmed
by his or her golf shot to the extent that such warning is reason-
able. However, the court continued, this obligation to warn does
not extend to those individuals not in the line of play to whom in-
jury is unlikely. 29 Because it was so close to the course, Hennes-
sey's property served as a depository for innumerable errant
golfers' golf balls.30 In addition, Pyne apparently was aware of
Hennessey's presence on and around the course.31 As a result, a
genuine issue a material fact existed as to whether "Pyne knew or
should have known that Hennessey was potentially in the foresee-
able zone of danger and whether Pyne should have anticipated the
25. See id. at 698 (quoting Ludwikoski v. Kurotsu, 875 F. Supp. 727, 731 (D.
Kan. 1995)); see also id. ("'If in sight of a residence a player makes such a poor shot
... and injury results to someone having no connection with the game, a cause of
action seems established against such a player.'") (quoting Nussbaum v. Lacopo,
265 N.E.2d 762, 769 (N.Y. 1970) (Bergan, J., dissenting)).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 698.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 698 (quoting Ludwikoski, 875 F. Supp. at 731).
30. See id. at 698 ("[The propinquity of [Hennesseyl's property to the course-
coupled with the proclivity of a driven golf ball to go astray-virtually ensured
that [Hennesseyl's condominium would receive its share of mishit balls unless pre-
ventative measures were taken.").
31. See id.
1998]
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danger to Hennessey and taken reasonable steps to avoid or lessen
that danger."3 2 Therefore, a jury finding, and not summary judg-
ment, is the proper method for determining the issue of Pyne's fail-
ure to warn.33
Assumption of the Risk
With respect to Pyne's assumption of the risk defense, the
court set forth the Rhode Island rule: a tortfeasor may escape or
diminish liability if the defendant creates "an unreasonable risk of
injury."34 In addition, the court outlined the elements of such a
claim. The defendant must show that the "plaintiff 'knew of the
existence of a danger, appreciated its unreasonable character, and
then voluntarily exposed himself [or herself] to it.'' 35 The court
concluded that the trial judge incorrectly disposed of this issue on
summary judgment.36 The court reasoned that, although Hennes-
sey was aware of the general risk of being struck with golf balls,
she was not aware of the particular risk of being hit by Pyne at the
time in question.37 Additionally, Hennessey's acceptance of the
risk may have been involuntary because she may have had no rea-
sonable alternative to exercise her privilege to stand on her own
property. Furthermore, the availability of the assumption of the
risk defense does not purport to extend golfers the right to banish
Hennessey to home confinement whenever they intend to tee off.38
Finally, Hennessey was not participating in nor observing the golf
game. As a result, the issue whether Hennessey assumed the risk
of being struck by golf balls when she "tarried" in her garden
presents an issue for a jury, rather than disposal on summary
judgment.3 9
32. Id. at 698-99 (footnote omitted).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 699 (quoting Labrie v. Pace Membership Warehouse, Inc., 678 A.2d
867, 872 (R.I. 1996)).
35. Id. at 699 (quoting Labrie, 678 A.2d at 872) (citing Lofredo v. Merrimack
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 669 A.2d 1162, 1164 (R.I. 1996) (stating that the court shall
inquire into "what the particular individual in fact saw, knew, understood, and
appreciated")).
36. See id. at 699-700.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 700.
39. Id. at 700-01.
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CONCLUSION
The supreme court held that the trial judge improperly dis-
posed of Hennessey's claim of negligence and improperly held that
Hennessey assumed the risk of being hit by golf balls when in her
garden. Specifically, the court held that a golfer owes a duty to
abutting landowners within reasonable striking distance of his or
her shot. Moreover, the facts here raise material questions of fact
regarding whether this duty was breached. Finally, the issue of
assumption of the risk presents an issue for the jury and should
not be disposed of by summary judgment. The supreme court
therefore sustained Hennessey's appeal as it related to these
claims, and remanded them to the trial court for further
proceedings.
